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| 100 | 1 | |a Felsenthal, Dan S. |d 1938-2019 |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1046922157 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Voting procedures under a restricted domain |b an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |c Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cham |b Springer |c [2019] | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (x, 92 Seiten) | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a SpringerBriefs in Economics | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- 2.1 Non-ranked Voting Procedures -- 2.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 2.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 2.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983) -- 2.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson, 1969) -- 2.2 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Not Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.2.1 Borda's Count (Black, 1958 -- Borda, 1784) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 2.2.3 Coombs's Method (Coombs, 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Coombs, Cohen, & Chamberlin, 1984 -- Straffin, 1980) -- 2.2.4 Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & Smaoui, 2018) -- 2.2.5 Bucklin's Method (Hoag & Hallett, 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman, 2006, p. 203) -- 2.2.6 Range Voting (Smith, 2000) -- 2.2.7 Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) -- 2.3 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 2.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black, 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean & Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.3.3 Nanson's Method (McLean & Urken, 1995, Chap. 14 -- Nanson, 1883) -- 2.3.4 Borda's Elimination Rule (BER) (Baldwin, 1926) -- 2.3.5 Copeland's Method (Copeland, 1951) -- 2.3.6 Black's Method (Black, 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.7 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny, 1959 -- Kemeny & Snell, 1960 -- Young, 1988, 1995 -- Young & Levenglick, 1978) -- 2.3.8 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz, 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.9 Young's Method (Young, 1977) -- Exercises for Chapter 2 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 2 -- References -- 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Upward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.2.1 Fixed Electorates | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.2.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Downward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.3.1 Fixed Electorates -- 3.3.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.4 Conclusions -- Exercises for Chapter 3 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 3 -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Various Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.2 Totally Invulnerable Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.3 Plurality with Runoff and the Alternative Vote (AV) Procedures -- 4.2.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 4.2.5 The Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 4.2.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 4.2.7 The Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Exercises for Chapter 4 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 4 -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Assumptions and Definitions -- 5.3 Examples Demonstrating the Possibility of No-Show Paradox Under Eight Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists in the Initial Profile -- 5.3.1 Black's Procedure -- 5.3.2 Kemeny's Procedure -- 5.3.3 Nanson's and the BER (Baldwin's) Procedures -- 5.3.4 Successive Elimination Procedure -- 5.3.5 Young's Procedure -- 5.3.6 Copeland's Procedure -- 5.3.7 Dodgson's Procedure -- 5.3.8 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 5.3.9 The Majority Judgment Procedure | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.4 Proofs Regarding the Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Two Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists and Is Elected in the Initial Profile -- 5.4.1 Minimax Procedure -- 5.4.2 Schwartz's Procedure -- 5.4.3 The Plurality with Runoff Procedure -- 5.4.4 The Alternative Vote Procedure -- 5.4.5 Bucklin's Procedure -- 5.5 Proofs Regarding the General Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Four Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 5.5.1 Plurality Voting -- 5.5.2 Approval Voting Procedure -- 5.5.3 Borda's Procedure -- 5.5.4 Range Voting Procedure -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 5 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 5 -- References -- 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Subset Choice Condition -- 6.3 The Condorcet-Consistent Voting Procedures -- 6.4 Seven Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Violating SCC Generally and Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 6.4.1 Plurality Voting -- 6.4.2 Plurality with Runoff -- 6.4.3 Alternative Vote -- 6.4.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 6.4.5 The Borda Count and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 6.4.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 6.5 Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Which Satisfy SCC -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 6 -- Answers to Exercises for Chapter 6 -- References -- 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.2.1 Minimax -- 7.2.2 Young's Procedure -- 7.2.3 Dodgson's Procedure -- 7.2.4 Successive Elimination -- 7.2.5 Black's, Copeland's, Kemeny's, Nanson's, Baldwin's and Schwartz's Procedures -- 7.3 Ranked Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.3.1 Plurality Voting | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7.3.2 Approval Voting -- 7.3.3 Plurality with Runoff -- 7.3.4 Alternative Vote -- 7.3.5 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 7.3.6 The Borda Count -- 7.3.7 Range Voting -- 7.3.8 Majority Judgment -- 7.3.9 Bucklin's Procedure -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 7 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 7 -- References -- 8 Summary -- Reference | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Electoral Politics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political Philosophy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Democracy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Welfare economics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Elections | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political science / Philosophy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic theory | |
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Record in the Search Index
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| DE-BY-TUM_katkey | 2405105 |
| _version_ | 1831257275802583041 |
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| author | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 Nurmi, Hannu 1944- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1046922157 (DE-588)121280845 |
| author_facet | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 Nurmi, Hannu 1944- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 |
| author_variant | d s f ds dsf h n hn |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045860559 |
| classification_rvk | MF 4400 |
| classification_tum | WIR 000 EDU 000 |
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| contents | Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- 2.1 Non-ranked Voting Procedures -- 2.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 2.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 2.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983) -- 2.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson, 1969) -- 2.2 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Not Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.2.1 Borda's Count (Black, 1958 -- Borda, 1784) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 2.2.3 Coombs's Method (Coombs, 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Coombs, Cohen, & Chamberlin, 1984 -- Straffin, 1980) -- 2.2.4 Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & Smaoui, 2018) -- 2.2.5 Bucklin's Method (Hoag & Hallett, 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman, 2006, p. 203) -- 2.2.6 Range Voting (Smith, 2000) -- 2.2.7 Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) -- 2.3 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 2.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black, 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean & Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.3.3 Nanson's Method (McLean & Urken, 1995, Chap. 14 -- Nanson, 1883) -- 2.3.4 Borda's Elimination Rule (BER) (Baldwin, 1926) -- 2.3.5 Copeland's Method (Copeland, 1951) -- 2.3.6 Black's Method (Black, 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.7 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny, 1959 -- Kemeny & Snell, 1960 -- Young, 1988, 1995 -- Young & Levenglick, 1978) -- 2.3.8 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz, 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.9 Young's Method (Young, 1977) -- Exercises for Chapter 2 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 2 -- References -- 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Upward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.2.1 Fixed Electorates 3.2.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Downward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.3.1 Fixed Electorates -- 3.3.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.4 Conclusions -- Exercises for Chapter 3 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 3 -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Various Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.2 Totally Invulnerable Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.3 Plurality with Runoff and the Alternative Vote (AV) Procedures -- 4.2.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 4.2.5 The Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 4.2.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 4.2.7 The Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Exercises for Chapter 4 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 4 -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Assumptions and Definitions -- 5.3 Examples Demonstrating the Possibility of No-Show Paradox Under Eight Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists in the Initial Profile -- 5.3.1 Black's Procedure -- 5.3.2 Kemeny's Procedure -- 5.3.3 Nanson's and the BER (Baldwin's) Procedures -- 5.3.4 Successive Elimination Procedure -- 5.3.5 Young's Procedure -- 5.3.6 Copeland's Procedure -- 5.3.7 Dodgson's Procedure -- 5.3.8 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 5.3.9 The Majority Judgment Procedure 5.4 Proofs Regarding the Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Two Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists and Is Elected in the Initial Profile -- 5.4.1 Minimax Procedure -- 5.4.2 Schwartz's Procedure -- 5.4.3 The Plurality with Runoff Procedure -- 5.4.4 The Alternative Vote Procedure -- 5.4.5 Bucklin's Procedure -- 5.5 Proofs Regarding the General Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Four Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 5.5.1 Plurality Voting -- 5.5.2 Approval Voting Procedure -- 5.5.3 Borda's Procedure -- 5.5.4 Range Voting Procedure -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 5 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 5 -- References -- 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Subset Choice Condition -- 6.3 The Condorcet-Consistent Voting Procedures -- 6.4 Seven Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Violating SCC Generally and Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 6.4.1 Plurality Voting -- 6.4.2 Plurality with Runoff -- 6.4.3 Alternative Vote -- 6.4.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 6.4.5 The Borda Count and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 6.4.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 6.5 Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Which Satisfy SCC -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 6 -- Answers to Exercises for Chapter 6 -- References -- 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.2.1 Minimax -- 7.2.2 Young's Procedure -- 7.2.3 Dodgson's Procedure -- 7.2.4 Successive Elimination -- 7.2.5 Black's, Copeland's, Kemeny's, Nanson's, Baldwin's and Schwartz's Procedures -- 7.3 Ranked Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.3.1 Plurality Voting 7.3.2 Approval Voting -- 7.3.3 Plurality with Runoff -- 7.3.4 Alternative Vote -- 7.3.5 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 7.3.6 The Borda Count -- 7.3.7 Range Voting -- 7.3.8 Majority Judgment -- 7.3.9 Bucklin's Procedure -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 7 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 7 -- References -- 8 Summary -- Reference |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-2-ECF)9783030126278 (ZDB-30-PQE)EBC5744648 (ZDB-30-PAD)EBC5744648 (ZDB-89-EBL)EBL5744648 (OCoLC)1189670671 (DE-599)BVBBV045860559 |
| dewey-full | 302.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 302 - Social interaction |
| dewey-raw | 302.1 |
| dewey-search | 302.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3302.1 |
| dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
| discipline | Pädagogik Soziologie Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>10859nam a2200997zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045860559</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20220216 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">190506s2019 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9783030126278</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-3-030-12627-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-2-ECF)9783030126278</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PQE)EBC5744648</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-30-PAD)EBC5744648</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-89-EBL)EBL5744648</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1189670671</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045860559</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-83</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-861</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M347</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">302.1</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MF 4400</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122721:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">WIR 000</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EDU 000</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Felsenthal, Dan S.</subfield><subfield code="d">1938-2019</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1046922157</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Voting procedures under a restricted domain</subfield><subfield code="b">an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes</subfield><subfield code="c">Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cham</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer</subfield><subfield code="c">[2019]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (x, 92 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SpringerBriefs in Economics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- 2.1 Non-ranked Voting Procedures -- 2.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 2.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 2.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983) -- 2.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson, 1969) -- 2.2 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Not Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.2.1 Borda's Count (Black, 1958 -- Borda, 1784) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 2.2.3 Coombs's Method (Coombs, 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Coombs, Cohen, & Chamberlin, 1984 -- Straffin, 1980) -- 2.2.4 Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & Smaoui, 2018) -- 2.2.5 Bucklin's Method (Hoag & Hallett, 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman, 2006, p. 203) -- 2.2.6 Range Voting (Smith, 2000) -- 2.2.7 Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) -- 2.3 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 2.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black, 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean & Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.3.3 Nanson's Method (McLean & Urken, 1995, Chap. 14 -- Nanson, 1883) -- 2.3.4 Borda's Elimination Rule (BER) (Baldwin, 1926) -- 2.3.5 Copeland's Method (Copeland, 1951) -- 2.3.6 Black's Method (Black, 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.7 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny, 1959 -- Kemeny & Snell, 1960 -- Young, 1988, 1995 -- Young & Levenglick, 1978) -- 2.3.8 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz, 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.9 Young's Method (Young, 1977) -- Exercises for Chapter 2 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 2 -- References -- 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Upward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.2.1 Fixed Electorates</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.2.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Downward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.3.1 Fixed Electorates -- 3.3.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.4 Conclusions -- Exercises for Chapter 3 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 3 -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Various Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.2 Totally Invulnerable Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.3 Plurality with Runoff and the Alternative Vote (AV) Procedures -- 4.2.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 4.2.5 The Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 4.2.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 4.2.7 The Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Exercises for Chapter 4 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 4 -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Assumptions and Definitions -- 5.3 Examples Demonstrating the Possibility of No-Show Paradox Under Eight Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists in the Initial Profile -- 5.3.1 Black's Procedure -- 5.3.2 Kemeny's Procedure -- 5.3.3 Nanson's and the BER (Baldwin's) Procedures -- 5.3.4 Successive Elimination Procedure -- 5.3.5 Young's Procedure -- 5.3.6 Copeland's Procedure -- 5.3.7 Dodgson's Procedure -- 5.3.8 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 5.3.9 The Majority Judgment Procedure</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.4 Proofs Regarding the Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Two Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists and Is Elected in the Initial Profile -- 5.4.1 Minimax Procedure -- 5.4.2 Schwartz's Procedure -- 5.4.3 The Plurality with Runoff Procedure -- 5.4.4 The Alternative Vote Procedure -- 5.4.5 Bucklin's Procedure -- 5.5 Proofs Regarding the General Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Four Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 5.5.1 Plurality Voting -- 5.5.2 Approval Voting Procedure -- 5.5.3 Borda's Procedure -- 5.5.4 Range Voting Procedure -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 5 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 5 -- References -- 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Subset Choice Condition -- 6.3 The Condorcet-Consistent Voting Procedures -- 6.4 Seven Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Violating SCC Generally and Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 6.4.1 Plurality Voting -- 6.4.2 Plurality with Runoff -- 6.4.3 Alternative Vote -- 6.4.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 6.4.5 The Borda Count and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 6.4.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 6.5 Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Which Satisfy SCC -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 6 -- Answers to Exercises for Chapter 6 -- References -- 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.2.1 Minimax -- 7.2.2 Young's Procedure -- 7.2.3 Dodgson's Procedure -- 7.2.4 Successive Elimination -- 7.2.5 Black's, Copeland's, Kemeny's, Nanson's, Baldwin's and Schwartz's Procedures -- 7.3 Ranked Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.3.1 Plurality Voting</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7.3.2 Approval Voting -- 7.3.3 Plurality with Runoff -- 7.3.4 Alternative Vote -- 7.3.5 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 7.3.6 The Borda Count -- 7.3.7 Range Voting -- 7.3.8 Majority Judgment -- 7.3.9 Bucklin's Procedure -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 7 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 7 -- References -- 8 Summary -- Reference</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield 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| id | DE-604.BV045860559 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-12-20T18:36:56Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783030126278 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031244049 |
| oclc_num | 1189670671 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-83 DE-1043 DE-Aug4 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-861 DE-523 DE-1049 DE-859 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-20 DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-92 DE-824 DE-573 DE-M347 DE-703 DE-706 DE-739 DE-634 |
| owner_facet | DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-83 DE-1043 DE-Aug4 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-861 DE-523 DE-1049 DE-859 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-20 DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-92 DE-824 DE-573 DE-M347 DE-703 DE-706 DE-739 DE-634 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (x, 92 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-2-ECF ZDB-30-PQE ZDB-2-ECF_2019 |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
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| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | SpringerBriefs in Economics |
| spellingShingle | Felsenthal, Dan S. 1938-2019 Nurmi, Hannu 1944- Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- 2.1 Non-ranked Voting Procedures -- 2.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 2.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 2.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams & Fishburn, 1978, 1983) -- 2.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson, 1969) -- 2.2 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Not Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.2.1 Borda's Count (Black, 1958 -- Borda, 1784) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 2.2.3 Coombs's Method (Coombs, 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Coombs, Cohen, & Chamberlin, 1984 -- Straffin, 1980) -- 2.2.4 Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & Smaoui, 2018) -- 2.2.5 Bucklin's Method (Hoag & Hallett, 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman, 2006, p. 203) -- 2.2.6 Range Voting (Smith, 2000) -- 2.2.7 Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) -- 2.3 Ranked Voting Procedures That Are Condorcet-Consistent -- 2.3.1 The Minimax Procedure -- 2.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black, 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean & Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.3.3 Nanson's Method (McLean & Urken, 1995, Chap. 14 -- Nanson, 1883) -- 2.3.4 Borda's Elimination Rule (BER) (Baldwin, 1926) -- 2.3.5 Copeland's Method (Copeland, 1951) -- 2.3.6 Black's Method (Black, 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.7 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny, 1959 -- Kemeny & Snell, 1960 -- Young, 1988, 1995 -- Young & Levenglick, 1978) -- 2.3.8 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz, 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.9 Young's Method (Young, 1977) -- Exercises for Chapter 2 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 2 -- References -- 3 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Upward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.2.1 Fixed Electorates 3.2.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.3 The (In)Vulnerability of the Investigated Procedures to Downward Monotonicity Failure -- 3.3.1 Fixed Electorates -- 3.3.2 Variable Electorates -- 3.4 Conclusions -- Exercises for Chapter 3 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 3 -- References -- 4 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The (In)Vulnerability of the Various Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 4.2.1 The Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.2 Totally Invulnerable Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 4.2.3 Plurality with Runoff and the Alternative Vote (AV) Procedures -- 4.2.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 4.2.5 The Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 4.2.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 4.2.7 The Majority Judgment (MJ) Procedure -- 4.3 Conclusion -- Exercises for Chapter 4 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 4 -- References -- 5 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Assumptions and Definitions -- 5.3 Examples Demonstrating the Possibility of No-Show Paradox Under Eight Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists in the Initial Profile -- 5.3.1 Black's Procedure -- 5.3.2 Kemeny's Procedure -- 5.3.3 Nanson's and the BER (Baldwin's) Procedures -- 5.3.4 Successive Elimination Procedure -- 5.3.5 Young's Procedure -- 5.3.6 Copeland's Procedure -- 5.3.7 Dodgson's Procedure -- 5.3.8 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 5.3.9 The Majority Judgment Procedure 5.4 Proofs Regarding the Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Two Condorcet-Consistent and Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures When a Condorcet Winner Exists and Is Elected in the Initial Profile -- 5.4.1 Minimax Procedure -- 5.4.2 Schwartz's Procedure -- 5.4.3 The Plurality with Runoff Procedure -- 5.4.4 The Alternative Vote Procedure -- 5.4.5 Bucklin's Procedure -- 5.5 Proofs Regarding the General Impossibility of the No-Show Paradox Under Four Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 5.5.1 Plurality Voting -- 5.5.2 Approval Voting Procedure -- 5.5.3 Borda's Procedure -- 5.5.4 Range Voting Procedure -- 5.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 5 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 5 -- References -- 6 Which of 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Subset Choice Condition -- 6.3 The Condorcet-Consistent Voting Procedures -- 6.4 Seven Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Violating SCC Generally and Under the Restricted Domain Assumption -- 6.4.1 Plurality Voting -- 6.4.2 Plurality with Runoff -- 6.4.3 Alternative Vote -- 6.4.4 Coombs's Procedure -- 6.4.5 The Borda Count and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) -- 6.4.6 Bucklin's Procedure -- 6.5 Three Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures Which Satisfy SCC -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 6 -- Answers to Exercises for Chapter 6 -- References -- 7 The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.2.1 Minimax -- 7.2.2 Young's Procedure -- 7.2.3 Dodgson's Procedure -- 7.2.4 Successive Elimination -- 7.2.5 Black's, Copeland's, Kemeny's, Nanson's, Baldwin's and Schwartz's Procedures -- 7.3 Ranked Non-Condorcet-Consistent Procedures -- 7.3.1 Plurality Voting 7.3.2 Approval Voting -- 7.3.3 Plurality with Runoff -- 7.3.4 Alternative Vote -- 7.3.5 Coombs's and the Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (NPER) Procedures -- 7.3.6 The Borda Count -- 7.3.7 Range Voting -- 7.3.8 Majority Judgment -- 7.3.9 Bucklin's Procedure -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks -- Exercises for Chapter 7 -- Answers to Exercises of Chapter 7 -- References -- 8 Summary -- Reference Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Electoral Politics Political Philosophy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Democracy Welfare economics Elections Political science / Philosophy Economic theory Politische Soziologie (DE-588)4046558-5 gnd Wähler (DE-588)4064144-2 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Abstimmung (DE-588)4166306-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4046558-5 (DE-588)4064144-2 (DE-588)4064286-0 (DE-588)4066735-2 (DE-588)4166306-8 |
| title | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |
| title_auth | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |
| title_exact_search | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |
| title_full | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| title_fullStr | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| title_full_unstemmed | Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi |
| title_short | Voting procedures under a restricted domain |
| title_sort | voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the in vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |
| title_sub | an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes |
| topic | Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Electoral Politics Political Philosophy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Democracy Welfare economics Elections Political science / Philosophy Economic theory Politische Soziologie (DE-588)4046558-5 gnd Wähler (DE-588)4064144-2 gnd Wahl (DE-588)4064286-0 gnd Wohlfahrtstheorie (DE-588)4066735-2 gnd Abstimmung (DE-588)4166306-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Electoral Politics Political Philosophy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Democracy Welfare economics Elections Political science / Philosophy Economic theory Politische Soziologie Wähler Wahl Wohlfahrtstheorie Abstimmung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8 |
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